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ABSTRACT 
In this article it will be argued that nothing is gained by ftirther subdividing the categories 
of communicated contení or by allowing the explicit and the implicit to overlap in content, 
and so the explicit / implicit distinction can remain exhaustive and classificatory as was 
originally claimed in relevance theory. First, Bach's notion of impliciture will be analysed 
and rejected as a useful category, and second, it will be argued that Carston's 
independence criterion gives us a distribution of the information communicated by 
utterances that meets the predictions of the criterion of consistency with the principie of 
relevance. To that effect, a number of counterexamples that have been levelled against the 
independence criterion are reanalysed and found to fit rather than viólate it. 
1. Introduction 
The concept of explicitness that Sperber & Wilson (1986) present in their theory is 
classificatory, like that of Grice, but differs from his in that the explicit in communication 
is seen as the result of decoding and inference, whereas for Grice the explicit could only be 
determined by conventional means.' As for the explicit / implicit distinction, it is exhaustive 
for both Grice2 and Sperber & Wilson: the assumptions communicated by an utterance are 
either explicit or implicit, but for the latter the explicit is also a comparative notion, allowing 
assumptions to vary in their degree of explicitness according to the amount of inference they 
require. 
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The main reason Sperber & Wilson parted company with Grice when drawing the 
explicit/implicit distinction was an awareness that linguistic expressions are semantically 
underdeterminate in many respects and henee not directly truth-evaluable, something to 
which pragmatists were not paying much attention at the time. But if both the recovery of 
explicit content and the derivation of implicatures require inference, Grice could not be 
right in assuming that the explicit/implicit distinction ran parallel to that between coded / 
inferred information and the identifying criterion for implicature could not be its 
dependence on contextual factors. 
Outside relevance theory, it has been felt that a correct characterization of linguistic 
communication requires further subdivisions (within the impücated, Levinson's generalised 
conversational implicatures (cf. Levinson (1995), within the explicit, Bach's implicitures), 
which have both blurred the distinction and called into question its exhaustiveness. And 
even within relevance theory the two categories are not always kept mutually exclusive, thus 
weakening the original claim that the explicit and the implicit are classificatory notions. 
In this paper I want to argüe first against the proliferation of levéis of representation to 
account for utterance interpretation, by bringing under scrutiny Bach's category of 
impliciture3. Second, against the (formal) blurring of the explicit/ implicit distinction by 
restoring Carston's (1988) independence criterion in the spirit in which she meant it, as a 
useful heuristic for the theorist given relevance theoretic assumptions about human 
cognition and communication. I will argüe that the alleged counterexamples to her criterion 
must be reanalysed and their logical and pragmatic status revised. 
2. Bach's implicitures 
K. Bach has recently taken up the issue of the semantic underdetermination of sentences in 
anumberofarticles(Bach 1987, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1997) and conceded that not every 
bit of inferred information is justifiably an implicature. However, instead of arguing from 
the incompleteness of semantic representations to an inferentially enriched notion of what 
is said, as is done in relevance theory, he proposes a third category impliciture that 
encompasses a) completions of the semantic representation of the sentence (other than 
reference assignment), b) non-literal uses of sentences in which no constituent is being used 
non-literally, what he calis standardized non-literality. Examples of (a) include cases of 
semantic underdetermination of sentences such as those in (1-5); examples of (b) are given 
in(6-ll): 
1. Steel isn't strong enough [for the job] 
2. The princess is late [for the party] 
3. Tipper is ready [to dance] 
4. The king has arrived [at the palace] 
5. Al has finished [speaking] 
6. You are not going to die [from this cut] 
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7.1 haven't eaten [today] 
8. Everyone [in the class] is going [to the concert] 
9. She has nothing [appropriate] to wear [to the party] 
10. The cupboard [in this house] is bare 
11. He has [exactly] three cars 
According to Bach, (a) and (b) differ in that the sentences in (a) do not express complete 
propositions (even after disambiguation and reference assignment), whereas those in (b) do 
express complete propositions, but not exactly the ones that the speaker wanted to express. 
Understanding the first group of cases requires a process of semanticlconceptual 
completion, whereas in the second group a "pragmatically mandated" process of lexical 
expansión is invoked to go fromthe proposition expressed by the sentence to the proposition 
expressed by the speaker. We thus seem to have three levéis of communicated information, 
what is said, the impliciture and the implicatures of the utterance. 
Although Bach's notion of saying differs from Grice's in crucial respects4, the main 
motivation for postulating this third category is to follow Grice in his characterisation of 
what is said as closely related to the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered, which 
he turas into a requirement that "anything that does not correspond to some element or 
feature of the uttered sentence is not part of what is said", (Bach 1994b:279) thus making 
a considerably stronger claim than the original. This justifies allowing the referents of 
indexicals to be part of what is said but not the added bits of information in (in 1 -5), which 
are confined to the impliciture because they are neither visible sentence constituents ñor 
syntactically required in any sense. This criterion for assigning pragmatically derived 
information to the explicit level of communication is what Carston (1988) calis a linguistic 
direction criterion. 
In what follows I shall argüe against the necessity of postulating implicitures in two 
steps: first by showing that his expansión cases are problematic and are more naturally 
analysed as cases of semantic underdetermination, and then by showing that neither what 
is said in Bach's sense, ñor his impliciture level are theoretically useful categories. 
2.1 
There is a whole host of expressions and constructions that give rise to pragmatic 
expansión, among them definite noun-phrases, ñames, numeráis, focus particles, 
quantifiers, operators, instances of loosened as well as narrowed down conceptual content, 
and some tenses. Given this diversity a detailed analysis of all of them is hardly feasible, so 
I will focus on those cases to which the author himself gives more attention. 
To begin with, if, as he claims, the sentences in (6-11) express complete propositions 
but not the ones the speaker wanted to convey (henee their non-literality), we are up against 
the oíd problem of demarcation with conversational implicature. Bach says that whereas an 
implicature is "a conceptually independent proposition" implicitures are "built out of what 
is said" (Bach 1994b:273),5 a purely stipulative characterization. We would need to know 
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what 'being conceptually independent' amounts to for the practical purposes of making 
decisions, given the growing number and the nature of cases in dispute. This issue will be 
addressed in section 3. The more specific distinguishing feature he raentions is 
detachability, aproperty of iraplicitures (cf. Bach 1994a:137) butnotof implicatures6. To 
¡Ilústrate the phenomenonKorta (forthcoming) uses Bach's examples in (12-13) and claims, 
following Bach, that since what is said is the same in both but only (12) gives rise to the 
impliciture in (14), implicitures are detachable: 
12. Thaven'thadbreakfast 
13.1 haven't had breakfast before 
14.1 haven't had breakfast this morning 
However, it is clear that the detachability of implicitures does not qualify as a criterion 
because to test for it one has to assume that what is said by a certain utterance of a certain 
sentence (say, (12)) corresponds to what Bach takes it to be (13), thus forcing us to assume 
what had to be proved in the first place. Since the view Bach is attacking favours (14) as 
what is typically said in utterances of (12), the test is simply not applicable and we are left 
with an unsolved problem of demarcation.7 
We see that what Bach takes as the explicit content of all uses of these sentences is based 
on the literal or conventional meanings he assumes for them. However, his meaning 
ascriptions are lar from uncontroversial. Let's take (6-8), (15) and their literal meanings in 
(6'-8'), (15') according to Bach: 
6. You're not going to die 
7.1 haven't eaten 
8. Everyone is going 
15.1' ve had breakfast 
6'. The hearer is immortal 
7'. The speaker has never eaten 
8'. Everyone in üie world is going 
15'. The speaker has had breakfast before8 
Even accepting that the present perfect or the 'going to' form are not indexical tenses in the 
sense that they do not identify specific points in time to which the speaker is referring, but 
rather quantify over periods of time, it is far from obvious that (6'-8'), (15') correctly 
characterize their context-free meaning. Notice that it is doubtful that one can use these 
sentences to communicate what the author takes to be their explicit content based on their 
literal meanings in (6'-8'), (15'), for the first three are patently false while the fourth is 
trivially trae, a rather awkward consequence of his analysis. In fect, when he defends his 
analysis of the sentences in (1-5) as not expressing complete minimal propositions, he 
argües that the reason (3) does not mean (3'), the minimal proposition, is that it is not 
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possible to use the former to communicate the latter, and so the sentence could not be used 
in its literal sense: 
3' . Tipper is ready for somefhing or other 
This would also be the case for its negation: 
3 ". Tipper is not ready for anything 
In the terms that will be defended here (3') might well be the explicit content of (3) on a 
certain -if not very common- occasion of its use, but in any case, his argument carries over 
intact to his examples of non-literality in (6-11). 
In fact, an analysis like F. Recanati (1993)'s in which the semantic representations of 
sentences involving quantifícation (whether explicit as in (8-9) or implicit as in certain 
tenses) requires the setting up of slots in the semantic representation of the sentence 
corresponding to the domains of quantification to be contextually specified, does nothave 
this problem and is more in line with current assumptions by cognitive linguists that view 
linguistic expressions as a series of constraints on interpretation (cf. Fauconnier (1994)). 
This would give us the (simplified) semantic representations for (7 and 8) in (7"-8"): 
7"_ -i h a s eaten 
The speaker thing inperiodof time before time ofutterance 
8". Everybody is going 
in domain of quantification place 
In this view, what Bach proposes as the literal meanings of (6-11) are in fact default 
completions of gaps in their semantic representations (or representations in which the valúes 
of the variables have already been chosen). Thus 'today' or 'never', or whatever other 
period may be relevant in the particular sentential and extrasentential context in which fhese 
tenses might appear, would fit in places already present in the representation. Besides, Bach 
need not worry about these aspeets of pragmatically determined content being part of what 
is said because tense is present in the sentence9. He fmds the idea of 'hidden markers' 
gratuitous (Bach 1997:4), but does not say why. When discussing incomplete definite 
descriptions (as in (10) above) which he takes as contributing unrestricted uniqueness 
requirements to what is said (as in (10') below), he again rejeets the idea of semantic slots 
as unnecessary: 
10'. The only cupboard there is in the world is bare 
"A standard use of a sentence like 'the table is dusty' concerns a particular table, but this 
fact can be explained without positing a semantic slot for a restriction on the universe 
of discourse or for a completion of the description. Strictly speaking, the utterance of 
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such a sentence is not literal -what the speaker means is an expansión of what is said" 
(Bach 1997:7). 
The problem is that his explanation has the undesirable consequence that speakers are 
forced to say something they do not mean on virtually every occasion of the use of a definite 
description, a problem which an alternative analysis of definite descriptions as contributing 
not only descriptive content but also a search procedure for a candidate referent does not 
nave. In fact, the strongest evidence against the type of semantics that Bach envisages for 
linguistic expressions comes from the problems to which his derived notion of what is said 
poses for pragmatic analysis, as we will see in the next section. 
I agree with Recanati as well that what Bach takes to be the explicit content of the 
utterance would not be recognised by speakers as such, (it would not be consciously 
available to them, which Grice seemed to require), but since intuitions can and nave been 
invoked to make opposite claims, due to the different ways in which the word 'say' can be 
taken, I will not argüe for ithere. In any case, it is as well to remember here that the explicit 
allows for degrees. Thus, although (8) and (16) may well be used to represent the same state 
of affairs, and so to say the same thing, recovering the proposition expressed requires less 
decoding and more inferencing in (8) and so we say that it is less explicit. 
8. Everyone is going. 
16. Everyone in the class is going to the concert. 
This in no way means that the pragmatic effects of both utterances will be the same: the 
claim is simply that the two utterances are equivalent at the level of the proposition 
expressed, not that they are equivalent in all other aspects of their interpretation, something 
that relevance theory is especially well suited to handle given the crucial role that effort 
plays in it. 
It seems then that we can reduce Bach's cases of expansión to cases of semantic 
underdetermination10, and therefore view them as resulting from a process of pragmatic 
completion of the semantic representation of the utterances involved. I want to argüe next 
that there is no justification for maintaining impliciture as a category that can be 
distinguished from the explicit content of the utterance. 
2.2 
It will be remembered that the reason Bach allows contextually determined referents 
(temporal, spatial, and personal) to be part of what is said is not that they are required for 
the utterance to be truth-evaluable but that they correspond to constituents of the sentence 
uttered, whereas "conceptually mandated semantic slots" (such as those for the implicit 
arguments of verbs like 'arrive' or 'finish') are not sentence constituents and so, "they enter 
in not at the linguistic but at the conceptual level" (cf. Bach 1994b:282, and also 1994b:132-
3). That information, according to Bach, is not Tinguistically there' to be recovered (cf. 
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Bach 1994a: 132). However, since it is the general cognitive system that performs the task 
of assigning particular entities to referring expressions, the level of what is said cannot be 
a grammatical level and must instead be conceptual structure, the level at which Bach's 
implicitures would ñt too. The question is if the linguistic direction criterion is sufficient 
grounds for positing two different sorts of conceptual representation with exacüy the same 
properties: both what is said and the impliciture are partly decoded and partly inferred 
structures. But what is said by an underdetermined sentence can never be a thought of the 
speaker's or what the speaker means, for as Bach himself concedes, "the conceptual 
representations that comprise them [thoughts] cannot be semantically underdeterminate in 
the way that sentences can be" (Bach 1994a:157).n 
It is also strange that Bach denies these semantic slots their linguistic status only because 
they are not syntactically required. After all, for someone who believes, as he does, that 
semantic structure is a grammatical level distinct from conceptual structure12, a semantic 
requirement must surely be a linguistic requirement. 
We see as well that, contrary to what Bach claims, the rigidity of his linguistic direction 
criterion does not seem to be in line with Grice's characterization of what is said, for by 
anyone's standards, the conventional meaning of a verb like, say, 'finish' requires two 
arguments.1314 And so we see again that it is Bach's overdetermined meaning 
representations that get in the way of a viable notion of what is said. 
Notice as well that his notion of what is said for both incomplete and non-literal 
sentences is at odds with Grice' s in that for the latter the implicatures of the utterance are 
calculated on the basis of what is said and the assumption that the maxims of conversation, 
or at least the cooperative principie, are in operation. But it seems clear that the implicatures 
of an utterance of (8) or (19) would have to be calculated by taking the pragmatically more 
elabórate representations he takes to be the implicitures as premises, not what is said, thus 
rendering it functionally inert (to borrow a phrase from Carston (1995)), as the examples 
below illustrate: 
8. A: Tipper is ready [to leave] [to come on stage] 
17. A wants me to cali a taxi 
18. A wants me to pulí up the curtain 
19. A: Do you want a coffee? 
B: I'vehad breakfest [a short while ago] 
20. B doesn' t want coffee 
It seems then that Bach's category of what is said can neither be a linguistic representation 
ñor a communicated category, and so we are left with its being cióse to the sentence as its 
only meritto theoretical utility. But since even that is questionable, as we have seen, we can 
conclude that his notion of what is said has to be modified to include the information he 
assigns to the impliciture, and so the explicit/implicit distinction can remain exhaustive. 
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3. Explicature implicated? 
It is generally assumed that the explicit and Üie implicit (or rather, the implicated) must be 
independent propositions, but discrepancies over particular cases have made it plain that 
what is meant by 'independent propositions' needs clarification15. The original dispute 
centred on whether what some pragmatists were describing as cases of generalised 
conversational implicature (21-22 below) might not in fact be cases of pragmatically 
determined explicit content, as was claimed in relevance theory16: 
21a. She gave him the key and he opened the door 
21b. She gave him the key and then he opened the door (implicature?) 
22a. Some of the students passed the exam 
22b. Not all the students passed the exam (implicature?) 
Of the different criteria that have been proposed17 to decide I want to focus on R. Carston's 
functional independence criterion because it catches the bull by the horns by claiming that 
the explicit and the implicit must not overlap in content, thus providing a clear notion of 
what she means by independent. For Carston, the reason why (21b-22b) are more than 
suspect implicatures is that they entail what is said by the utterance and so make it 
redundant, "playing no independent role in inference" (Carston 1988:158). This wouldgive 
us an analysis incompatible with relevance theoretic assumptions about the role of 
processing effort in utterance interpretation: 
"It is clearly more economical to derive the single assumption 'P & then Q' rather than 
both 'P & Q' and 'P & then Q', and whatever contextual effects 'P & Q' gives rise to so 
will 'P & then Q', as well as having potential for more" (...) 
"In general, whatever constitutes an adequate range of contextual effects, they can be 
derived entirely from the single assumption 'P and then Q', which is more economical to 
derive and manipúlate than the two assumptions. In fact if 'P and then Q' were understood 
as an implicated assumption the derivation of S [the implication] would follow from 
contextual assumptions alone. Then it would not qualify as a contextual implication...". 
So relevance theory not only predicts that it is the correct analysis, it precludes the other 
one." (Carston 1988:170-171). 
Surely Carston is right that an analysis of what is implicated by an utterance which 
entails what is said should make the theorist have second thoughts. F. Recanati (1989) 
agrees with her that (21 b-22b) provide the explicit content of (21 a-22a) but notes that her 
functional independence heuristic boils down to a requirement of logical independence of 
the propositions comrnunicated by an utterance and so she is committing an instance of what 
he calis 'the formal fallacy in pragmatics', "for it is quite possible for an implicature to have 
this property accidentally" (Recanati 1989:320). In what follows, a number of alleged 
counterexamples to Carston's criterion understood in exactly the way Recanati finds 
problematic will be reanalysed, bearing in mind that in relevance theory both what is said 
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and what is implicated are fully truth-conditional categories of communicated information 
and that it is speakers that say, whereas sentences and linguistic expressions in general 
provide information that directs the construction and recovery of the propositions that the 
speaker is trying to make mutually manifest. It will be argued that given these assumptions 
Recanati's accident is not pragmatically possible. 
,3.1. The counterexamples to the independence criterion 
To prove his case that the independence criterion is not a valid one, Recanati makes up 
examples like the following: 
"Suppose that John says to Jim: 'Someone will come and see you today -someone you 
have been expecting for a long time. 1 am not permitted to reveal the identity of visitors 
in advance, but I take it that you see who I mean'. Suppose it is clear that John means that 
Mrs Robertson is going to come and see Jim. Has John said that Mrs Robertson is going 
to come? No: he has said that someone was going to come, and has implied that it was Mrs 
Robertson. The implication is very clear, but the fact that it is an implication and not 
something that is explicitly said, is no less clear ..." (Recanati 1989:318) 
23a. John: Someone will come and see you today 
23b. Mrs Robertson will come and see you today (implicature?) 
I would like to argüe that contrary to what Recanati claims, it is far from clear that we 
have an implicature here. To begin with there is an element of secrecy to the utterance ('I 
am not permitted to reveal the identity of visitors in advance') which casts doubt on whether 
(23b) can be said to constitute a communicated assumption even if its representation has 
been provoked in the hearer. But let us suppose for the sake of argument that it has been 
communicated. Does the interpretation of this example require the generation of (23b) as 
an implicature? Notice that there is no more economical way of communicating (23b) than 
uttering (23b) itself, and that in the example no additional effects are obtained by uttering 
(23a) instead. This means that the exchange would not meet the criterion of consistency with 
the principie of relevance. (23b) is also problematic as a Gricean implicature for the 
behaviour of the speaker cannot be reconciled with the assumption that s/he being rational 
and cooperative. Besides, notice that John goes out of his way to make sure that Jim 
correctly identifies the referent to be replaced by the indefínite pronoun, (T take it that you 
see what I mean') and so what we have here might well be a local pragmatic process of the 
kind that Recanati himself later called a 'transfer process' (cf. Recanati 1993, 1995) which 
he describes as involving "an already available constituent which is mapped into another one 
which replaces it" (Recanati 1993:263). This happens when the replacing candidate 
becomes more accessible through múltiple activation than the constituent being processed, 
as interpretation proceeds on-line. We see then that either (23b) is not a communicated 
assumption or, if it is, it must be analysed as the explicit content of the utterance, not an 
implicature, and therefore there is no accidental entailment of the two categories. 
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The second counterexample Recanati discusses is more complex: 
A: Was there anybody rich at the party, who might be asked to pay for the damages? 
B: Jim is rich 
A: Yes, but did he go to the party? 
B: I don't know, but I can tell you that if anybody was there, Jim was there. 
A: Somebody was there -this I know for sure (I saw John going there). So it looks as if 
the damages will be paid for, after all. (p. 320) 
24. B: If anybody was there, Jim was there 
24a. A: Somebody was there. John was there 
24b. Jim was there (implicature?) 
According to Recanati there are three candidates for the status of what is said in (24a): a) 
There is at least one person that was at the party, b) John was at the party and c) Jim was at 
the party, this last option being the one that the independence criterion would select, but 
which no-one in their right mind would propose. For him option (b) is not a good one either 
because indefinite pronouns do not have referential readings. So we are left with (a), the 
option that his intuitions favour but which violates Carston's principie. However, this need 
not be so, for even if we agree that indefinite pronouns are not referring expressions, this 
does not mean that they are barred from being used to refer on occasion, as we saw in the 
first example. Here A makes it clear that s/he has a specific referent in mind, (that 
'somebody' is clearly not equivalent to 'some person or other') so much so that the identity 
of the person involved is the next thing s/he contributes to the exchange, thus manifestly 
inviting the hearer to replace the indefinite with the fully identified referent. This very 
possibility weakens Recanati's certainty that the alleged implicature in (24b) entails what 
is said in (24a). But suppose we alter the example so that the possibility of a referential 
reading for the indefinite pronoun in (24a) does not arise. Does that mean that (a) is the only 
candidate we have for the explicit content of (24a)? Before concluding that it is, I would like 
to explore the possibility of a fourth option briefly. 
Indefinite noun-phrases allow a span of possible interpretations that range from 
máximum specificity when the domain of quantification only contains one individual, to 
máximum unspecifícity, in which case the domain of quantification covers any and all 
individuáis that satisfy the predícate. Leaving aside the question of whether cases involving 
maximally determined domains can be said to be instances of referring, this means that 
when making decisions about what has been said by an utterance including an indefinite 
expression the hearer will use whatever information is sententially or extrasententially 
available to decide on the appropriate domain. A common trap theorists fall tnto is using the 
least determínate option as the default reading and then treating it as the explicit content of 
all uses of such expressions. But there is no evidence that this is what hearers actually do 
and no reason why they should. And then, there are the problems this kind of strategy poses 
for the analysis, as we saw in section 2. To dissolve the entailment between (24b) and (24a) 
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this time, we have to consider (24) first and decide what B might be saying by means of it. 
We see that the maximally general reading is true if Jim went to the party, but this turns the 
conditional statement into a tautology: (Pa -> Pa), clearly not what B meant. This means that 
the indefinite must be interpreted as more specific than that, at least as not including Jim, 
i.e., as 'someone other than Jim'. As for the indefinite in (24a), we see again that if it 
includes Jim then (24b) is explicit and if it does not -as Recanati thought- the alleged 
impHcature would not entail the explicit content of (24a). Either way no entailment appears 
between what is said in (24a) and the implicated conclusión in (24b). The exchange has this 
formnow (where, crucially, x * a): 
24'. A: If someone (other than Jim) was at the party, Jim was at the party 
(3x Px - Pa) 
24a'. B: Somebody (other than Jim) was atthe party (3x Px) 
24b'. Jim was at the party (Pa) 
It turns outthat (24b) entails (24a) only if we assign maximally general default valúes to the 
domains of quantification of the indefinite pronouns in (24-24a). But since it is utterances 
that we are dealing with, our analysis cannot afford to obviate aspects of their interpretation 
that would no doubt be playing a part. 
There is another important problem with this kind of example in that it is not at all 
obvious that an implicated conclusión that follows from the premises supphed by two 
different speakers is anything more than that, an implicated conclusión, since implicatures 
are assumptions that the speaker manifestly expects the hearer to derive and attribute to 
him/her. In Recanati's example it is clear that this option is too strong from the very way 
the speaker in (24a) weakens his/her epistemic backing to it ('it looks as if the damages will 
be paid for, after all'), but this criticism is meant to apply generally to all cases in which 
speaker A uses a conditional sentence and speaker B asserts the antecedent of the 
conditional. Notice that the problem is not that we may be dealing with an indeterminate 
implicature as in cases of vague(r) communication: while it is perfectly natural to check out 
on the intentions of the speaker by making the implication derived explicit in cases of 
indeterminacy, it is unnatural to do so in this case, as witness the contrast between (25) and 
(26): 
25. A: What are you going to do today? 
B: I'veaheadache 
A: Does that mean that you're not doing the shopping today? 
26. A: If Mary was late the whole plan fell through 
B: Mary was late 
A: ?Does that mean that the whole plan fell through?18 
This same argument applies as well to Levinson's counterexample in (27) below but 
Levinson's example has problems of its own. He argües against Carston that "many 
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implicatures meet the condition on explicatures that they must contain the encoded semantic 
representation or logical form as a proper subpart" (Levinson 1987:723) and gives the 
following example: 
27. A: If Thatcher has won the election, she will have won three times 
27a. B: Thatcher has won the election 
27b. Thatcher has won the elections three times (implicature?) 
As with Recanati, one wonders what makes his intuition about what is implicated in these 
cases so overriding, given that (27b) may well be trae but folse that Thatcher has won the 
elections being referred to, and so it is doubtful that (27b) entails (27a)19. In any case, one 
might think that it is possible to construct counterexamples to the independence principie 
by fabricating slightly different exchanges like (28) below, in which the first speaker uses 
a condicional sentence the antecedent of which entails the consequent. A second speaker 
asserting the antecedent would be saying something that entails the alleged implication, thus 
going in the opposite direction to that intended by Levinson, but still providing an apparent 
violation of Carston's principie20: 
28. A: If Thatcher has won this election she will at least have won one election 
28a. B: She has won this election 
28b. She has at least won one election (implicature?) 
But since B cannot but communicate (28b) by analytic rule, (28b) is unquestionably part of 
the explicit content of the utterance. Could it be an implicature as well as the main 
explicature of the utterance? The problem is that it does not seem possible to make sense of 
it as a contextual implication, much less an implicature, for it is not the case that bringing 
together (28) and (28a) as premises "yields new conclusions not derivable from either [(28)] 
or(28a)] alone" (Sperber & Wilson 1986:107).21 Notice as well that (28) is tautological and, 
as such, nothing is said by it. It does focus the attention of the hearer on certain facts, and 
it may well achieve optimal relevance by doing just that, but contextual implications are 
combinations of oíd and new information and that is not what we have here. 
If the counterexamples proposed were valid the characterization of the explicit and the 
implicit as being mutually exclusive would not be correa, and therefore Sperber and 
Wilson's view of the explicit as a classificatory notion (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986:182) 
would have to be modified. D. Wilson seems to have made a move in this direction recently 
by claiming that 
"We allow for the possibility that entailments and implicatures may coincide, as in the 
following example: 
[29]. Peter: Would you like to listen to my Rolling Stones record? 
[29a] Mary : No. I'd rather hear some music. 
|29bJ. Peter's Rolling Stones record is not music (implicature?! 
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Here, Mary's utterance suggests thatPeter's Rolling stones record is notmusic, and this 
suggestion has all the hallmarks of a Gricean implicature. However, it is also an 
entailment: Mary's statement that she would rather hear some music than hear Peter's 
Rolling Stones record entails that Peter's Rolling Stones record is not music. Thus what 
is recovered as an implicature may also be an entailment, and our definition of implicature 
does not rule this out". (I. Higashimory & D. Wilson 1996:122) 
As Wilson says, (29a) entails (29b) since the arguments that the predicate 'rather' takes 
must be treated as belonging to mutually exclusive categories. This means that (29b) has 
been made available by analytic rule. What the hearer has to decide next is whether Mary 
seriously believes this proposition or whether she is simply being echoic and therefore wants 
it to be taken attributively, as is typical of ironical utterances (cf. Sperber & Wilson 
1986:237-243). But as we saw before, it does not seem to be correct to talk about 
implicature in this case. For if the hearer already has available the information in question 
what would s/he gain by re-deriving it? And then, how could we even talk of a contextual 
implication here when (29b) is derivable from the proposition expressed by (29a) and no 
other premise? 
This same kind of reasoning would apply to some of tiie examples quoted in the 
relevance theory literature as clear cases of implicature but which on closer inspection 
viólate the independence criterion. Consider (30-32) below: 
30. A: Does John drink whisky? 
30a. B: He doesnll drink alcohol 
30b. John does not drink whisky (implicature?) 
30c. Whisky is alcohol (implicature?) (Wilson & Sperber 1986) 
31. A: Would you drive a Mercedes? 
3 la. B: I wouldnlí drive any expensive cars 
3 Ib. B would not drive a Mercedes (implicature?) 
31 c. A Mercedes is an expensive car (implicature? (Sperber & Wilson 1986) 
32. A: Have you red Susan'sbook? 
32a. B: I donlt read autobiographies 
33b. B has not read Susan's book (implicature?) •* 
33c. Susan's book is an autobiography (implicature?) (Carston 1988) 
(30) is obviously the clearest case, for again, (30b) follows from (30a) by analytic rule, 
since 'whisky' is a hyponym of 'alcohol' .(31) might seem more controversial, since in this 
case the property of being expensive is a contingent property of Mercedes cars, albeit one 
the speaker is most likely to share with the hearer. Notice that (31b) can only be a 
communicated assumption if A attributes (31c) to B, and that understanding (31a) must 
involve some working out of the extensión class of 'expensive car', not necessarily 
exhaustive, of course, but at least as including 'Mercedes cars', given the prominence of 
this element in the exchange. (31c) then seems to be part of the explicit content of the 
utterance, rather than an implicature. 
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(32) is an example that Carston uses to illustrate her point that the principie of relevance 
sets an upperbound on what can count as pragmatically determined aspects of explicit 
content, but which Groefsema (1995) reanalyses as a case of explicit communication. 
Notice that the same as before, the hearer will not be able to establish the relevance of B's 
answer in (32a) unless s/he includes 'Susan's book' in the extensión class of 
'autobiographies', and again the entailment between (33a) and (33b) is automatic. In fact, 
in the three cases it is not possible for the speaker to deny the alleged implicature without 
contradiction, in contrast with clear cases of impücature such as (36): 
33. John does not drink alcohol and he drinks whisky (which is alcohol) 
34. I would not drive any expensive cars and I would drive a Mercedes (which is an 
expensive car) 
35. I do not read autobiographies and I have read Susan's book (which is an 
autobiography) 
36. A: Would you like a coffee? 
36a B: I'vejusthadone 
36b. B does not want a coffee (implicature) 
36c. 1' ve just had a coffee and I want another one 
The reason it has seemed so natural to speak of conversational implicature in (30-32) is that 
the contextual assumptions in (30c-32c) are needed for üieir derivation. But notice that 
before we can decide that (30b-32b) constitute implicated conclusions we must have made 
a decisión concerning the explicit contents of (30a-32a) and the generic terms they include, 
and that just as bridging reference requires the construction or retrieval of contextual 
assumptions that are "incorporated into a representation of the proposition expressed by the 
utterance" (Wilson 1993:177) so too, deciding on the extensión class of the generic noun 
phrases may well require a similar process. And so the automatic assignment of the 
assumptions in (30b-32b) to the domain of implicatures must be reconsidered. 
It seems then that an assumption is communicated at the explicit or the implicit level but 
not at both, and that in so far as what is implicated is calculated on the basis of the explicit 
content of the utterance both require that the hearer identify them as intended and so it 
cannot be indifferent either if a certain piece of information is part of the explicature or an 
implicature of the utterance. 
To conclude, we return to Recanati and ask what criterion allows his intuitions on how 
to allocate communicated content to remain unshaken in the face of cases of content overlap 
such as those he himself presents in (23-24). He says: 
"This type of counterexample shows that what defines a communicated assumption as an 
implicature is not a formal property, and in particular not the formal property of (logical) 
independence with respect to the proposition expressed, but the way it is recovered in the 
interpretation process -i.e. not by enriching and developing a logical form encoded in the 
sentence, but by an inference process the starting point of which is proposition obtained 
by enriching and developing an encoded logical form." (Recanati 1989:321) 
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But since both-processes depend on inference and, as Groefsema (1995:64) points out, 
there is no agreement on the ways logical forms can be enriched and developed (or, for that 
matter, what logical forms to assign, as we saw with Bach, or even if it is sentences that we 
must assign logical forms to), we would be left with our intuitions as our only guide22. 
4. Conclusión 
As Bach suspected, the dispute over how to allocate communicated content to the explicit 
or to the implicit level and how many levéis of representation are required is not a 
terminological issue. For in so far as pragmatics seeks to explain how speakers understand 
(and produce) utterances, the distinctions we postúlate have a direct consequence on our 
description of the cognitive operations that speakers carry out. I have tried to show that 
Bach's category of impliciture is based on a questionable analysis of the meanings of 
linguistic expressions and turns what is said into a category whose linguistic and pragmatic 
status is very problematic. It therefore constitutes no improvement over the relevance theory 
notion of explicature. 
I have also defended Carston's independence criterion as a useful heuristic for any 
theory which makes processing effort a key factor in utterance interpretation, for as she 
contended, if the implicatures of an utterance entail its explicit content, there is no role for 
the latter to play, and if the explicit content entails what is implicated, deriving the 
implicature would be rutile. In fact, when looked at in detail, the examples which were 
devised to counter the independence principie turn out to support, rather than viólate it. 
The explicit/implicit distinction can therefore remain exhaustive and classificatory. 
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I am greatly indebted to Pablo Rodríguez for helping me clarify the issues raised in this article 
over the past few months. Many thanks as well to Eva Delgado and John Tynan for carefully 
reading draft versions. 
1. Unlike the implicit, which, in his view, could be determined both conventionally and 
unconventionally. 
2. I am ignoring here the fact that for Grice speech act and propositional attitude information 
were not included in either category, as D. Wilson points out (cf. Higashimory & Wilson 1996). 
3. See Carston (1995) for thorough and persuasive criticism of generalised conversational 
implicatures as a distinct level of representation. 
4. Most notably, for Bach saying something does not entail meaning it, and so it is possible 
in his sense to say something and not mean anything. 
5. He also says that implicitures are "intended additional conceptual material to be read into 
one's audience" (Bach 1996:7) or "implicit in what is said" (Bach 1994a: 141), strongly suggesting 
that they are subpropositional and inserted in the explicit content of the utterance. If this were so, 
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the distinction impliciture / explicature would boíl down to nothing more than a terminological 
quibble. However, he disallows this position by claiming that "since part of it [the impliciture] 
does not correspond to any elements of the uttered sentence (...) it is inaccurate to cali the 
resulting proposition the explicit content of the utterance or an explicature. I will instead cali it 
an impliciture"(Bach 1994b:273). He also insists "For me there is inexplicit meaning, but no 
inexplicit saying" (1994a: 144, and 1994b:274). Besides, although he sometimes reckons that this 
may be a question of what terminology you favour ("Perhaps (...) one person's explicature is 
another one's impliciture" (Bach 1994b:274)), he also claims that "Presumably the dispute here 
is not over terminology but over psychologically relevant distinctions needed for an account of 
understanding utterances" (Bach 1994a: 161). 
6. See Grice (1975:43-44) on the non-detachability of implicatures. 
7. He also uses the hearer's indirect quotation test, based on the idea that "What is said is 
specifiable by a that clause embedded in a matrix clause of the form S said that ..." (Bach 
1994b:278) to defend his analysis of whatis said in the case of underdetermined sentences as not 
fully propositional. Thus the fact that I can report to you 'S said that steel isn't strong enough' 
(or for that matter, 'S said that he's had breakfast') counts for Bach as intuitive evidence that 
what is said by the corresponding unembedded sentences does not include the conceptual 
additions of implicitures. But, if anything, this would be evidence that referents are not part of 
what is said either, for it is equally possible to quote a sentence including an indexical term. 
8. Notice as well that it is far from clear in what sense 'You're not going to die from that cut' 
or 'I haven't eaten today' can be said to be expansions or "fleshing outs" of 'You are ¡mmortal' 
and 'I've nevr eaten'. This may be the reason Bach describes expansión as a lexical, not a 
logical, process of strengthening, "the result of inserting additional words into the sentence" 
(1994b:279). 
9. It is strange that Bach allows for the pragmatic specifications for genitive locutions to be 
part of whatis said, butnotdomain restrictions on quantifíed expressions (cf. Bach 1994a: 151). 
After all there is conceptual material in (b) which does not correspond to any elements in (a) and 
so it seems that he should be talking about impliciture here as well: 
a. John's book 
b. the book that John wrote. 
10. See Carston (1995) for a semantic analysis of numeráis in terms of underdetermination. 
11. This clashes with his characterization of literal uses as cases in which the speaker means 
no more than s/he says and torces him to modify it to allow for completions as well. But this 
leaves us with the paradoxical consequence that expressions such as "what is strictly and literally 
said", which he often uses (cf. Bach 1994a: 158), are uninterpretable. 
12. Something which Jackendoff, for one, does notbelieve. (Cf. Jackendoff 1996). 
13. Bach also quotes Grice (1989:24-5) to the effect that what is said must correspond to "the 
elements of the [sentence], their order, and their syntactic character", but then Grice never said 
that his notion of saying allowed for non-propositional representations, and certainly seems to 
have led everyone to believe that it did not. 
14. He could have avoided this last problem by assigning minimal propositions to incomplete 
sentences, thus reducing all cases of impliciture to non-literal expansions. But then the problems 
outlined in section 2.1 would have to be solved. 
15. Thus, for example, although both Recanati and Bach speak of independent propositions 
and claim that what is implicated is external to the proposition expressed, they reject the idea that 
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this amounts to a requirement of logical independence, and so one wonders how one is meant to 
understand these notions. 
16. See Carston (1995) and references therein. 
17. See Carston (1988) and Recanati (1993) for a discussion of other criteria. 
18. This is the reason the claim in the postface to the last edition of Relevance seems too 
strong: 
"...if it is mutually manifest to communicator and audience that an assumption contextually 
implied by an utterance increases its overall relevance, then it is (in general) mutually 
manifest that the communicator intended this implication to be manifest. In other words, the 
assumption is communicated (as an implicature)". (Sperber & Wilson 1995:275) 
19. This was pointed out to me by Fernando García. 
20. Carston's independence heuristic naturally applies both ways, for an explicature which 
entails the implicature would not play an independent role in the interpretation process either. 
21. For a detailed analysis of Levinson's example in (27) as partly tautological and not giving 
rise to the implication in (27b) see Vicente (forthcoming). 
22. I agree with Recanati that our intuitions (as speakers when speaking. not as more or less 
sophisticated theoreticians), generally give us the right analysis, but this is not an applicable 
criterion. As for the scope principie, there does not seem to be any reason why a Gricean might 
be convinced that the temporal sequencing communicated by some uses of 'and' is a matter of 
explicit content when seeing the conjoined utterance embedded in a disjunction or a conditional 
sentence, if the unembedded utterance had not moved him/her. 
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